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Abstract
This paper explores interactions between growth, economic liberalization
and democratization during transition. The results can be summarized as
follows: (1) Liberalization has a strong positive effect on growth during
transition (also when controlling for endogeneity of liberalization in
growth). (2) Democracy facilitates economic liberalization. (3) Because of
its effect on liberalization, democracy has a positive overall effect on
growth. Nevertheless, the marginal effect of democracy (after controlling
for progress in economic liberalization) is negative during early transition.
(4) The progress in democratization in turn depends on past economic
performance in a surprising manner—the relationship between past growth
and subsequent democracy appears negative. (5) Economic performance is
an important determinant of electoral outcomes and, in particular, of
support for reforms.
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Non-Technical Summary
After the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union cast off
communism, they generally set out (at least initially) to implement economic and political
reforms simultaneously. This stands in contrast with previous successful transitions in
countries such as Chile, South Korea and Taiwan (where political liberalization followed only
after economic reforms were well under way), or the current transition in China (where
economic liberalization unfolds with little simultaneous democratization). Nevertheless,
despite the similarities at the outset, the 25 countries in transition subsequently displayed a
large degree of variation in their approaches to economic liberalization and democratization,
as well as in economic performance. While some countries sustained the momentum and
succeeded in implanting important elements of democracy and the market economy, others
essentially returned to being autocracies with overwhelming state interference in the
economy. The countries in the region lived through economic collapses dwarfing the Great
Depression, military aggressions, civil wars, coup d’états, surge of crime and violence, but
also resumption of growth and accelerating integration with Western Europe.4
This variation of approaches and outcomes raises several important questions. Did
democracy facilitate or constrain progress in economic liberalization? Was there a trade-off
between democracy and growth? Did the countries that stalled or reversed the initial
democratization gain in terms of their subsequent growth? Was there indeed a case for a
benevolent dictator who would be in a better position to implement efficiency-enhancing
reforms while temporarily postponing democratization?
A-priori, the answers to these questions are not obvious. Several studies have argued
that democracy is a precondition for sustained long-term growth and economic prosperity
because it guarantees the rule of law and contract enforcement. On the other hand, democracy
introduces important political constraints that may affect the actions of the government and/or
limit its ability to proceed with the needed but costly reforms (for example, by allowing for
reform-minded governments to be toppled in democratic elections). Similarly, democracy
may increase uncertainty about future policies, as a future government may not necessarily
continue policies or live up to commitments of the current one. Overall, it is far from clear
which of these factors is more important during the transition. The empirical evidence on the
relationship between democracy and growth in market economies is mixed at best. For the
transition economies, it is essentially non-existent.
The present paper explores interactions between democratization, economic
liberalization and growth during post-communist transitions in Central and Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union. The results can be summarized as follows: (1) Liberalization has
a strong positive effect on growth during transition. This holds also when controlling for
possible endogeneity of liberalization in growth (progress in liberalization does, however,
appear to depend crucially on initial conditions). (2) Democracy encourages liberalization (in
the context of Granger causality, democracy causes liberalization). Countries, which
introduced greater democracy, subsequently progress further in economic liberalization too.
(3) Because of its reinforcing effect on liberalization, democracy has a positive overall impact
on growth. Nevertheless, the marginal effect of democracy (after controlling for the progress
in economic liberalization) was negative during early part of transition. (4) The progress in
democratization in turn depends on past economic performance in a surprising manner—the
relationship between past growth and subsequent democracy appears negative (further
research may be necessary to illuminate this result). (5) Economic performance is an
important determinant of electoral outcomes and, in particular, of support for reforms.
Support for parties associated with reforms falls with unemployment and increases with5
growth, output level relative to 1989 and, somewhat surprisingly, inflation. Progress in
economic liberalization lowers political support for reform parties, but the extent of
democracy is positively correlated with support for reforms in elections.
Introduction
After the communist regimes collapsed throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union, they were replaced (at least initially) by relatively wide-ranging democracy. Measured
by the indices of political freedom and civil liberties published by the Freedom House (see
www.freedomhouse.org), by 1993—two to three years after the transition began—the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Slovenia attained the same extent of democracy as the United
Kingdom or Germany. Although other countries did not democratize as rapidly as the three
front-runners, they also made considerable progress. Between 1989 and 1991, the average of
the two Freedom-House indices rose from 0.26 to 0.57, on a scale from zero (no democracy)
to one (full democracy).
1
The high speed of democratization reflected not only the desire of these countries’ citizens
to live in democracy, but also the encouragement or outright pressure from Western
governments, international organizations, and especially the European Union, which made
democracy an explicit precondition for accession negotiations. This approach, simultaneous
implementation of political and economic reforms (in fact, political reforms often even
preceded the economic ones), stands in sharp contrast with the experience of countries such as
Chile, Taiwan and South Korea, where democratization followed only after economic
liberalization proved successful, or with the current Chinese approach based on economic
liberalization without democratization.
Ten years later, however, democracy and prosperity are far from prevailing universally in
the former communist countries. Overall, the outcomes in terms of economic performance
and political developments have been very diverse. While some countries have been
successful in sustaining the reform momentum and eventually resuming growth, others
experienced reform reversals, reemergence of authoritarian regimes and/or protracted
economic decline. The objective of this paper is to analyze the mutual interactions between
economic performance, economic liberalization and democratization during the transition.
Has simultaneous introduction of economic and political reforms adversely affected the
                                                
1 It should be emphasized, however, that the Freedom House indices only measure the extent of democracy
in a given year. Obviously, the tradition of democracy, built up only gradually, is of crucial importance as well.6
ability of the transition countries to proceed with economic liberalization—for example, by
imposing political constraints on the speed of reform (see Roland, 2000)? Is there a trade-off
between democracy and growth? Have the countries that postponed or reversed
democratization been able to grow faster than the more democratic ones?
The literature offers an abundance of opinions but no consensus on the effect of
democracy on economic growth. On the one hand, North (1991, 1993) and Olson (2000)
argue that democracy is a precondition for sustained long-term growth and prosperity,
because it guarantees the protection and enforcement of property rights. Similarly, Rodrik
(2000) posits that democracy leads to higher growth because it lowers economic uncertainly,
delivers better institutional outcomes and results in better response to adverse shocks. Indeed,
Rodrik suggests that democracy is a meta-institution that facilitates creation of other growth-
enhancing institutions. Minier (1998) finds that the countries which democratized appear to
grow faster than ex-ante similar countries without democratization. In contrast, empirical
studies based on large cross sections of countries suggest that the relationship is negative
(Helliwell, 1994) or hump-shaped (Barro 1996, 1999), but not robustly so (see Przeworski
and Limongi, 1993). Barro explains the negative effect of democracy (beyond a moderate
level) on growth by pointing out that democratic countries typically implement excessive
redistribution programs. Democracy may also lead to inefficient policy outcomes, especially
in case of economically costly policies. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) show that rational
voters may choose not to support efficiency-enhancing reform because of individual
uncertainty about the resulting payoffs. Such a reform would be sustained ex post once
implemented (for example by a benevolent dictator) but would be rejected if subjected to a
vote  ex ante. Similarly, Alesina and Drazen (1991) illustrate how war of attrition over
asymmetric payoffs may lead to efficiency-enhancing reforms being delayed. Finally,
governments facing elections may pursue policies that maximize the prospects of reelection,
even if these are detrimental to long-term economic growth.
The experience of post-communist countries can shed new light on the relationships
between democracy and growth. The transition process can be seen as essentially a controlled
experiment, involving 25 countries with little or no initial democracy and ex-ante similar
(though not identical) in terms of economic development. Subsequently, the paths followed
by the individual countries in terms of economic and political liberalization diverged
dramatically, with some introducing democracy and economic freedom essentially at level
with Western Europe, and others reverting to authoritarian rule and central planning. By7
observing the variety of approaches to democratization as well as the respective economic
outcomes, one can infer new insights about the importance of democracy for economic
performance. These insights can have important implications not only for transition countries,
but also for developing countries contemplating economic and/or political liberalization.
The empirical results obtained with a sample of 25 transition economies suggest that,
overall, democracy is good for growth because it reinforces economic liberalization (which in
turn has a strongly positive effect on growth). However, the marginal effect of democracy
after controlling for progress in economic liberalization appears negative during the initial
transition period. Hence, democracy alone, if unaccompanied by a correspondingly economic
liberalization, harmed growth performance immediately after the collapse of communism.
The analysis then turns to exploring the effect of economic performance on political
developments. While essentially all transition countries introduced at least a moderate level of
democracy initially, the subsequent developments differed substantially—either because of
the unwillingness of political elite to introduce and sustain wide-ranging democracy, or
because the reform-minded government failed to sustain political support. Somewhat
surprisingly, progress in democratization during the later transition period (1994-98) appears
negatively related to past growth (over 1990-93). Hence, the countries that experienced
deeper output contractions early in the transition in turn implemented greater democracy—
possibly because of political changes instigated by the adverse economic outcomes.
The final part of the analysis looks closer at determinants of electoral outcomes (using a
sample of 17 elections in 7 countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe). The support for
pro-reform parties falls with unemployment, and rises with economic growth, output level
(relative to 1989) and, somewhat surprisingly, inflation. Progress in economic liberalization,
however, reduces the support for reforms, as the costs of reforms apparently go beyond
deteriorating economic performance. In contrast, the level of democracy increases the support
for reforms.
The next section takes stock of the main economic outcomes of the transition in 25
countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union (FSU) and
briefly surveys the literature attempting to explain the differences in economic performance
among the post-communist countries. Section 3 introduces the analytical framework and
explores the relationship between economic liberalization and growth. Section 4 investigates
the effect of democracy on growth and section 5 analyzes the determinants of democracy8
during transition. Section 6 looks at one of the main sources of differences in political
developments—electoral outcomes. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2  Explaining Growth Performance during Transition
The economic outcomes of transition have been very diverse: while some countries
resumed growth after two to four years of recession, others experienced deep and protracted
collapse of economic activity without much subsequent recovery. Table 1 reports some basic
indicators of economic performance for 25 transition countries. According to the official
statistics, economic activity virtually collapsed in many post-communist countries. By 1998,
real GDP shrank to between 25 and 83  % of the level attained in 1989 (Georgia and
Uzbekistan, respectively, were the two extremes). The average cumulative output fall across
the 25 countries listed in Table 1 was 42 %. This transition-induced contraction easily dwarfs
that reported by the US during the Great Depression (34%). The output fall was also relatively
long-lasting, the average duration of the depression was 5.6 years, 4.2 years in CEE and the
Baltics and 7 years in the FSU. The subsequent cumulative increase of GDP was
disappointingly small, 10 % on average. As of 1998, only in Poland and Slovenia exceeded
the pre-transition (1989) level of output. In contrast, Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and
Kazakhstan, reported essentially no recovery.
Insert Table 1 about here.
It is generally accepted that the official statistics exaggerate the severity of the output fall.
The statistics directly measure the production of medium-sized and large firms, but only
estimate the output of small firms, which make up most of the new and growing private
sector. Over-reporting under communism (in order to meet targets stipulated by the central
plan) and under-reporting at present (for tax purposes) also play a role. Furthermore, the
official statistics fail to properly account for the transfer of economic activity from the official
to the unofficial economy. Finally, a part of the output fall may be due to elimination of
unmarketable production, reduction of waste, as well as a fall in inventories as the shortage
economy turned into a surplus one (which per se is associated with greater efficiency).
Nonetheless, even if overestimated by official statistics, the reform-induced output fall in
CEE and FSU was undoubtedly very severe.
Several theoretical explanations have been suggested to account for the output fall. Calvo
and Coricelli (1993) attribute the contraction to credit restrictions, and high real interest rates9
due to overly restrictive monetary policy. Blanchard and Kremer (1997), and Roland and
Verdier (1999) develop supply-side explanations. Accordingly, output fell because of
disorganization of supplier-buyer relationships due to asymmetric information about outside
options in bargaining (Blanchard and Kremer), or search frictions and relation-specific
investment (Roland and Verdier), respectively. Hillman and Ursprung (2000) suggest that the
output fall occurred because economic and political reforms were not accompanied by a
change of political culture. They argue that as the political culture of rent seeking remained in
place, time and resources spent for rent-seeking activities even increased, thus precipitating
the output fall.
The empirical literature, on the other hand, focused primarily on assessing the impact of
the choice of reform strategy (shock therapy vs. more gradual reform) on economic
performance during transition. This focus was spurred by the contribution of De Melo et al.
(1996). They constructed annual liberalization indices assessing transition economies’
progress in three areas, liberalization of the internal markets, liberalization of the external
markets, and privatization and restructuring, between 1989 and 1994. These indices were then
used to construct a measure of cumulative liberalization (cumulative liberalization index,
CLI), defined as the sum of yearly weighted-average indices (with weights 0.3, 0.3 and 0.4,
respectively). Using the CLI as an explanatory variable for economic performance, they found
that greater liberalization was associated with higher growth and lower inflation (both
averaged over 1993-94). This finding inspired a host of subsequent contributions, some
reaching similar conclusions (e.g. Sachs, 1996; and Fischer et al., 1996, 1997; Selowsky and
Martin, 1997), others disputing them.
In particular, Åslund et al. (1996) show that the relationship between liberalization and
average growth over 1989-95 turns out insignificant after including dummies for the ruble
zone (including the Baltics) and war-torn countries. Åslund et al. interpret this result as
proving the overwhelming importance of initial conditions. Accordingly, favorable initial
conditions explain both the greater progress in liberalization as well as better economic
performance of Central European countries.
2 Heybey and Murrell (1999), Krueger and Ciolko
(1998) and Popov (2000) put forward similar arguments, using more elaborate analytical
                                                
2 However, this result highlights an important problem inherent to the construction of the CLI. The FSU
countries started liberalizing later and therefore their CLI’s are by definition lower. The ruble-zone dummy then
proxies for cumulative liberalization and effectively divides the post-communist countries into groups with high
and low cumulative liberalization. Given the small sample size (24 countries), the CLI itself then turns out
insignificant.10
techniques. Krueger and Ciolko show that the progress in cumulative liberalization (measured
by the CLI) can indeed be explained by regressing it on a dummy for the FSU, GNP per
capita as of 1988 and the ratio of exports to GDP. More importantly, they argue that the CLI
is endogenous in output decline—countries that experienced lower contraction of output were
able to liberalize faster. Heybey and Murrell estimate a system of simultaneous equations to
show that there is in fact two-way causation between economic growth and the speed of
liberalization (measured as the change in the annual liberalization index
3).
Finally, Berg et al. (1999) evaluate the relative importance of the initial conditions and the
progress in liberalization for growth performance and find that the initial output fall is
attributable primarily to initial conditions and macroeconomic instability whereas the effect of
liberalization on growth was overwhelmingly positive. When considering separately the
effects of liberalization on state and private sectors, they conclude that liberalization
contributed to the contraction in the state sector but this was more than compensated by the
expansion in the private sector. This finding is similar to those of Havrylyshyn et al. (1998)
and Wolf (1999) who show that liberalization has a J-curve effect on output growth—a
negative contemporaneous effect is more than compensated by subsequent gains (at one and
two-year lags).
3  Liberalization, Initial Conditions and Growth
This section explores the relationship between liberalization and growth in a cross section
of 25 transition countries. The progress in implementing economic reforms is measured by the
liberalization index of de Melo et al. (1996) and the subsequent progress-in-transition
indicators published by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).
4
The two series have been linked up by Havrylyshyn et al. (1998) into a single time series
covering the entire transition period.
5 The analysis is performed with averages of all variables
over longer periods (cf. Havrylyshyn et al., 1998; Berg et al., 1999; and Wolf, 1999, who use
annual data). This approach should minimize the noise in the data, due to measurement errors
or short-term fluctuations caused by external factors. On the other hand, a disadvantage is the
                                                
3 Heybey and Murrell (1999) rightly criticize the CLI because it reflects neither the level nor the speed of
reform. The former is measured by the annual liberalization index whereas the latter is captured by the change of
the annual index. The more recent literature typically uses the annual liberalization index rather than the CLI.
4 The EBRD publishes annually the following indicators: large-scale privatization, small-scale
privatization, governance and enterprise restructuring, price liberalization, trade and foreign-exchange
liberalization, competition policy, banking reform and securities markets.11
lower number of degrees of freedom. To partially remedy this problem, I split the period
under consideration into two sub-periods, 1990-93 and 1994-98, and run pooled regressions
over both sub-periods (nevertheless, for comparison, I also present results of separate
regressions for the early transition period and the later period).
As is standard in the empirical growth literature, I estimate most regressions with the
growth rate of per-capita GDP as the dependent variable. Nevertheless, since the previous
literature on growth patterns during transition typically used the growth rate of overall GPD, I
present results with this dependent variable as well. The explanatory variables are the
liberalization index, a proxy for initial conditions (distance from the country’s capital to
Brussels), a dummy for countries engaging in military conflicts, secondary school enrolment,
and initial income per capita. I tried including also other variables typically found significant
in the growth literature, in particular the investment rate, but they turned out insignificant.
Initial conditions are proxied using the distance from Western Europe (measures as
distance between the country’s capital and Brussels).
6 This is intended as a measure of factors
such as historical legacies, social, cultural and religious traditions, institutional factors and
economic development. In addition, it also reflects the cost of engaging in economic relations
with Western Europe. The distance replaces the typically used dummy for the former Soviet
Union. Unlike the FSU dummy, it provides a continuous measure of initial conditions:
undoubtedly, the initial conditions in Estonia were dramatically different from those in, for
example, Tajikistan. The liberalization index is negatively correlated with the distance from
Western Europe: the correlation coefficient between the distance and the liberalization index
for 1990-93 (1994-98) is –0.74 (–0.66). Hence, the further a country lies from Brussels, the
more reluctant it was to implement radical economic reforms. In addition to the distance from
Western Europe, a dummy for countries affected by military conflicts (Croatia, Macedonia,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Tajikistan) is also included in the regressions.
Overall, the impact of liberalization on growth (see Table 2) is positive and strongly
significant. The regression reported in column 2 includes an interaction term between the
liberalization index and a dummy for 1994-98. The coefficient on this interaction term
indicates that liberalization had a more powerful effect during the later period. This is also
confirmed by separate regressions for the two sub-periods (columns 5 through 8). In column
3, a square of the liberalization index is added to the regression, which results in better overall
                                                                                                                                                        
5 The resulting series thus covers 1989-98. I am grateful to Ron van Rooden for sharing their data with me.12
fit (higher adjusted R
2). Hence, the relationship between liberalization and growth appears
non-linear (U-shaped). Liberalization worsens growth at low levels but accelerates it after a
moderate level of liberalization has already been attained. Either no liberalization or complete
liberalization is thus better than intermediate liberalization. The minimum effect of
liberalization is attained at a value of the liberalization index around 0.35-0.39, which is just
above the level attained by Russia and Moldova. Once this minimum level has been exceeded,
there are increasing returns to further liberalization. Nonetheless, the linear relationship gives
a slightly better statistical fit in separate regression for the 1994-98 period (compare columns
7 and 8).
Insert Table 2 here.
Krueger and Ciolko (1998) and Heybey and Murrel (1999) argue that the liberalization
index is in fact endogenous in economic performance, in particular growth, as countries with
favorable economic performance may find it easier to implement costly reforms. If this is the
case, then the coefficient estimated by OLS for the relationship between liberalization and
growth will be biased. To control for the potential endogeneity bias, I instrumented the
liberalization index. The results are reported panel B of Table 2. To improve the precision of
estimation, the first-stage regressions are estimated with annual observations rather than
period averages. The instruments used for the liberalization index in columns 9 through 11 are
the following: lagged value of the liberalization index, initial GNP per capita, number of years
the country spent under communism, war dummy and a quadratic transition-time trend.
7 In
columns 12 through 14, the lagged value of liberalization index is replaced by its value as or
1989 (thus the second set of instruments contains only pre-transition variables so as to
completely rule out the endogeneity bias). With both sets of instruments, the estimated impact
of liberalization on growth remains significant and positive—in fact, it turns out even stronger
(compare, for example, columns 7, 11 and 14). Hence, liberalization has a positive and
statistically significant effect on growth, which is apparently not due to endogeneity (although
initial conditions clearly have played an important role in determining progress in economic
liberalization).
The U-shaped relationship between liberalization and growth during the contraction
period may be due to two effects. On the one hand, countries that postponed radical reforms
                                                                                                                                                        
6 For Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, the distance to Brussels is
estimated as 6,000 km.
7 Transition-time trend is zero before the start of transition (see Fischer and Sahay, 2000, Figure 1).13
or implemented them more gradually may have succeeded in avoiding some of the adverse
effects experienced by the more reform-enthusiastic countries. Nevertheless, such an
intermediate reforms apparently did not prevent disorganization effects (see Blanchard and
Kremer, 1997; and Roland and Verdier, 1999) from occurring eventually. On the contrary, the
outcome of the intermediate reform is worse than either that of a full reform or of no reform.
Several other factors besides liberalization have been important determinants of growth
during transition. The effect of being farther from Western Europe appears negative, although
it is often not significant. Engagement in military conflicts, not surprisingly, is associated with
substantially lower growth, by 8-10 percentage points annually. On the other hand, once the
war is over, the affected countries grow more rapidly (by 3-5 percentage points annually) as
they make up for the loss of output.
Secondary-school enrollment and the initial level of GNP are two of the variables
typically found important in the economic growth literature—see, for example, Barro (1991),
and Levine and Renelt (1992). The coefficient on initial GNP per capita is negative (but not
always significant). The negative coefficient is consistent with the notion of conditional
convergence, as predicted by the neoclassical growth theory—poor countries grow faster after
controlling for other factors affecting growth. Secondary-school enrollment is positively
correlated with growth, in particular during the later period. Other variables suggested by the
growth literature, in particular primary-school enrollment and government expenditure, were
generally not significant. In fact, if anything, government expenditure actually appears to have
a positive effect on growth during transition (Campos, 1999, obtained a similar result).
Investment (as a share of GDP) shows a significant and positive effect only during 1990-93,
whereas it is insignificant and negative during the recovery (not reported). Tichit (1999) finds
that investment has positive effect on growth only in the CEE countries, whereas its effect is
insignificant in the FSU—this can explain the insignificant results for a cross section
containing both CEE and FSU countries.
The regressions reported in Table 2 provide a rather good account of growth in the
transition countries, with adjusted R
2’s ranging between 0.53 and 0.80. The most important
explanatory variable is the liberalization index, which alone (along with the constant and
dummy for 1994-98) produces an adjusted R
2 of 0.57 (0.60 when the interaction term for
liberalization during 1994-98 is included) in the pooled regression. The distance from
Brussels alone results in an adjusted R
2 of 0.52. The two war dummies yield an adjusted R
2 of14
0.58. Secondary school enrollment and the initial GNP per capita yield adjusted R
2 of 0.46
and 0.44, respectively.
4  Democracy and Growth
The transition countries implemented, at least initially, economic and political
liberalization simultaneously (in many post-communist countries, political reforms in fact
proceeded faster than the economic ones). This approach may have affected their economic
performance in several ways. First, democracy brings about political constraints (see e.g.
Roland, 2000) that may slow down progress in economic liberalization (for example, through
voters’ opposition to reform implementation of their support for reform reversal) and, in turn,
harm economic performance during transition. Second, democracy increases uncertainty, as
future governments may not necessarily continue policies and honor commitments introduced
by the previous government. On the other hand, as emphasized by North (1991, 1993) and
others, democracy ensures that property rights are guaranteed and is therefore a necessary
precondition for sustained long-term growth. Anecdotal and survey evidence, especially from
the former Soviet Union, seems to support this point (see Shleifer, 1998).
At first sight at least, democracy is seemingly associated with higher growth during
transition. Table 1 reports values of a democracy index based on the Freedom House indices
of political rights and civil liberties.
8 Countries that introduced wide-ranging democracy
generally report higher growth. This pattern is unlikely to be due to reverse causality (faster
growing countries being able to introduce greater democracy) because democratization
largely preceded resumption of growth in post-communist countries.
Although the trade off between democracy and growth has been frequently alluded to in
the transition literature and policy discussions, the effect of democracy on economic growth
during transition has not been explicitly studied. Nevertheless, De Melo et al. (1996) and
Dethier et al. (1999) observe that the extent of democracy among post-communist countries is
positively correlated with the progress in economic liberalization (the correlation coefficient
between annual values of the liberalization and democracy indices over 1990-98 is 0.66).
They argue therefore that democracy facilitates economic liberalization and thus has a
positive, albeit indirect, effect on growth (without considering the direct effect).
                                                
8 The index reported in Table 1 is the average of the two indices, rescaled to take values between zero (no
democracy) and unity (full democracy).15
Democracy appears to have a strong positive effect on growth when entered in a
regression without controlling for the progress in liberalization (see Popov, 2000). However,
the result is strikingly different when democracy is entered alongside liberalization, as shown
in panel A of Table 3. The regressions control for the same variables included already in
Table 2: the liberalization index, the distance from Western Europe, secondary school
enrollment, the two war dummies, and initial GNP. Table 3 distinguishes between the
marginal effect of democracy on growth (i.e. the effect after controlling for the progress in
economic liberalization) reported in panel A and the total effect (i.e. accounting also for the
indirect effect of democracy on growth through its effect on economic liberalization) in panel
B.
Insert Table 3 here.
The marginal effect of democracy on growth turns out insignificant in the regressions
spanning the entire period. Nevertheless, the effect appears negative and significant during the
first part of transition, as reflected in the negative coefficient on an interaction term between
the democracy index and a dummy for 1990-93 (column 2). This pattern is confirmed also in
the separate regression for 1990-93, although only with a marginally significant coefficient
(this can largely be attributed to the smaller sample size). Hence, after controlling for progress
in economic liberalization, it appears that democracy hindered growth, at least during the
early transition period. However, this does not necessarily imply that the overall effect of
democracy on growth was also negative. As argued by De Melo et al. (1996) and Dethier et
al. (1999), democracy may reinforce progress in economic liberalization and, because
liberalization has a positive effect on growth, the total effect of democracy may in fact be
positive.
9 Panel B of Table 3 therefore investigates the overall effect of democracy. This is
done by a two-step procedure.
10 First, the liberalization index is regressed on the democracy
index. This yields the following estimates (with t-statistics in parentheses):
1990-98: Liberalization = 0.185 (5.42) + 0.632 (12.45)*Democracy  [Adj.R
2: 0.759]
1990-93: Liberalization = -0.111 (2.70) + 0.956 (15.34)*Democracy  [Adj.R
2: 0.662]
1994-98: Liberalization = 0.393 (11.06) + 0.435 (8.78)*Democracy  [Adj.R
2: 0.752]
                                                
9 Dethier et al. (1999) stop short of testing for causality between liberalization and democracy.
Nevertheless, a simple Granger causality test reported in the next section confirms that indeed democracy causes
liberalization rather than the other way around.
10 I am indebted to Sylviane Guillaumont for this suggestion.16
Second, the residuals from the above regressions are used as an explanatory variable, denoted
residual liberalization, alongside the democracy index. Residual liberalization measures
liberalization beyond the level that can be explained by democracy.
Applying this procedure, the total effect of democracy on growth (panel B of Table 3)
appears positive and strongly significant. Nevertheless, the coefficient on the interaction term
between the democracy index and the dummy for 1990-93 again indicates that the effect is
less pronounced during the early period (this is also reflected in separate regressions for 1990-
93 and 1994-98 reported in columns 10 and 11). Importantly, the effect of residual
liberalization remains positive and mostly significant, i.e. liberalization beyond the level that
is attributable to democracy is beneficial for growth.
In summary, democracy indeed has had a positive overall effect on growth during
transition because of its positive impact on economic liberalization. However, democracy
alone, when not accompanied by correspondingly far-reaching liberalization, had a negative
marginal effect on growth during the early transition period (1990-93). The negative marginal
effect can be ascribed to two factors (at least). First, democracy is associated with greater
political uncertainty, as democratic governments are faced with political backlash in the wake
of short-term adverse effects of the reforms. Such uncertainty may reduce the incentives for
economic agents to engage in long-term profit-seeking activities. Second, governments facing
elections may pursue short-term political aims or implement policies that constrain actions of
the future government (see Chapter 2 in Roland, 2000) even if the outcome of such actions is
detrimental to economic performance. Both factors become less important during the later
phase of the transition, as economic and political developments consolidate.
5  Determinants of Democracy
The previous section treated democracy as exogenous, assuming the post-communist
countries were free to choose any level of democracy. However, democratization itself is an
outcome of political processes (one of them being elections, the topic of the next section),
which, in turn, may be affected by the ongoing economic developments as well as initial
conditions. Therefore, this section explores the underlying determinants of democratization in
the post-communist countries. A standard finding on the relationship between democracy and
economic performance is that democracy is positively correlated with economic
development—as countries become more affluent, they also turn more democratic (see Lipset,17
1959; Helliwell, 1994; Barro, 1996, 1999; Londregan and Poole, 1996)—a finding referred to
in Political Science as the Economic Development Thesis (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994).
Accordingly, since the post-communist economies experienced dramatic deteriorations in
standards of living, one should expect the initial democratization to be reversed (indeed, this
is the prediction formulated by Barro, 1996, for Hungary).
To test this prediction, Table 4 relates the extent of democracy attained during 1994-98 to
the progress in liberalization, democracy and the average growth rate, all pertaining to 1990-
93. The regressions thus seek to determine the effect of economic performance as well as
those of prior progress in economic liberalization and democratization on the subsequent
extent of democracy. The focus is on democratization in the later transition period as the
initial democratization was apparently largely exogenous (reflecting primarily the extent of
popular discontent with communism and the ability of the former communists to retain
power). As discussed above, after the initial democratization, the subsequent progress differed
substantially, ranging from re-imposition of authoritarian regimes (as was the case in Belarus
and much of Central Asia) to implanting democracy comparable to that in Western Europe. A
question of particular interest is whether the countries that experienced more severe output
fall responded by reversing the initial democratization—as implied by the economic
development thesis.
Insert Table 4 here.
In contrast to the prediction stipulated by the economic development thesis, the effect of
past growth on subsequent democracy turns out negative. In fact, the lagged average growth
rate appears as the most significant determinant of subsequent democratization. The result is
robust to omitting the liberalization and democracy indices from the regression. Moreover,
regressions with contemporaneous growth rates yield insignificant coefficients on growth
both for 1990-93 and 1994-98 (not reported).
To further test the robustness of this finding, column (5) reports regression results with the
growth rate replaced by a residual growth rate, constructed as the residual from a regression
relating growth during 1990-93 to contemporaneous liberalization (including a squared term),
democracy, the distance from Western Europe, a dummy for military conflicts and the log of
initial GNP (the results of this regression are reported in the Notes accompanying Table 4).
This approach should eliminate the possibility of a bias stemming from the correlation
between growth and the other explanatory variables included in Table 4 (see the discussion in
sections 3 and 4). The coefficient estimated for residual growth thus measures the net effect of18
growth whereas the coefficients estimated for the remaining explanatory variables now
measure their total contributions to the progress in democratization—including any indirect
impact they may exert on democracy via their effect on growth. Nonetheless, the effect of
growth on democracy obtained using this procedure remains negative and significant, and of
essentially the same magnitude as before. Hence, it appears that the effect of growth on the
subsequent democratization is indeed negative, i.e. the deeper is the initial output fall, the
greater is the subsequent extent of democracy.
11
Though peculiar at first sight, this relationship may be due to the specific nature of the
post-communist period. After the initial democratization (which, as discussed above, was
largely exogenously determined), countries that experienced deeper output fall in turn may
have experienced more dramatic political transitions, with the governments being replaced by
more reform-minded ones. In contrast, countries that remained autocratic, but succeeded in
avoiding an excessive output fall (for example Belarus and Uzbekistan), in turn stayed non-
democratic. Nevertheless, further research may be necessary to shed additional light on this
perplexing result.
Finally, the regressions summarized in Table 4 suggest that both lagged democracy and
liberalization enhance subsequent democracy. Yet, it was argued in the preceding section (in
line with Dethier et al, 1999, and de Melo et al., 1996) that the causality runs from democracy
to liberalization. This question deserves greater attention. A simple Granger-causality test
reveals that indeed democracy causes liberalization rather than the other way around. When
regressing annual observations of the democracy index on the liberalization index, and vice
versa, the following results obtain
12:
LIt = 0.108 (8.12) + 0.720 (15.58) * LIt-1 + 0.166 (3.73) DIt-1  [adj. R2 = 0.884]
DIt = 0.109 (4.32) - 0.068 (-1.37) * LIt-1 + 0.921 (21.89) DIt-1  [adj. R2 = 0.771]
where LIt and DIt stand for liberalization and democracy indices, respectively. The results
clearly show that whereas the lagged value of the democracy index is significant as a
determinant of subsequent liberalization, the lagged value of the liberalization index does not
                                                
11 Nevertheless, the opposite result is obtained in analogous regressions with annual rather than averaged
data and one-year lags—growth appears to have a positive lagged effect on democracy (results are available on
request). However, the magnitude of the effect is much smaller (one tenth of that reported in Table 4, in absolute
value) and it is only significant in a regression spanning the entire transition period (1990-98). In separate
regressions for 1990-93 and 1994-98, it turns out insignificant (and actually negative in the former).
12 Heteroskedasticity t-statistics are in parentheses. The regressions are estimated with 224 observations, i.e.
9 years and 25 countries, with one observation missing (Macedonia in 1990). Because of the short length of the
series, only one lag is included.19
cause subsequent democracy. The results are analogous when additional variables (initial per-
capita GNP, years under communism, military conflict dummy and quadratic time trend) are
included (not reported).
6  Economic Performance and Political Support for Reforms
After studying the inter-relationships between economic performance, liberalization and
democratization, I now turn to the ultimate mechanism determining policy choices: elections.
Elections are the major feedback channel through which voters express their displeasure about
past and current policies and, by choosing the government, select policies to be implemented
in the future (see Nannestad and Paldam, 1994, for an extensive survey of the recent
literature).
Economic reforms were associated with a substantial worsening of the standard of living
for large segments of the transition economies’ populations, at least in the short term. In turn,
the support for radical economic reforms collapsed dramatically shortly after the onset of the
reforms. Fidrmuc (2000a,b) shows that the intensity of the political backlash against reforms
reflects the balance between favorable and adverse effects of the reforms. A good example of
this relationship is the Czech Republic, where the pro-reform parties remained in power for as
long as unemployment remained low.
The relationship between economic performance and the support for reforms has been
explored mainly theoretically so far (see, for example, Rodrik, 1995). Empirical analysis has
been scarce up to date, primarily because of the lack of appropriate data. Recent empirical
work includes Warner (1997), Brainerd (1999), Hayo (1999) and Fidrmuc (2000a,b). The
approach utilized in the present paper is similar to that of Fidrmuc (2000b), but instead of
using regional data, the analysis is based on a cross section of 17 elections in seven countries
of Central and South-Eastern Europe: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland,
Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovenia. This subset of countries was chosen because they are all at
least moderately democratic (any analysis of electoral outcomes would be meaningless in
non-democratic countries, which then excludes most of the former Soviet Republics), data for
them are relatively easy to come by, and classification of parties according to their political
orientation is relatively straightforward than is the case with other countries.
Table 5 presents the results. The dependent variable is the share of votes received in each
election by parties categorized along two dimensions: their political orientation (pro-reform
parties, and left wing/nationalist parties), and incumbency (cf. Fidrmuc, 2000b). The election20
results are regressed on variables reflecting economic performance: unemployment rate,
growth rate, index of output relative to the level attained in 1989 and the inflation rate. In
addition, the regressions reported in the lower part of Table 5 include also the liberalization
and democracy indices. All variables pertain to the election year.
13 The regressions were
estimated by OLS with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Using the logit
transformation for the dependent variable yielded virtually identical results.
14
Insert Table 5 here.
The results for economic-performance variables reveal a pattern similar to the findings of
Fidrmuc (2000a,b). Regressions where parties are classified according to their political
orientation yield very high explanatory power (with adjusted R
2 of 0.6 or higher). In contrast,
regressions with parties classified according to incumbency yield adjusted R
2 of only 0.3-0.4.
Hence, the categorization of parties according to their political orientation is apparently better
suited for the analysis of factors underlying voting behavior in the transition countries. The
results suggest that economic performance has strong bearing on electoral outcomes.
Unemployment reduces the support for pro-reform parties, and increases the support for left
wing and nationalist parties. One percentage point of unemployment transforms into a gain of
nearly two percentage points for the left-wing and nationalist parties, and a corresponding loss
for the reformers. Economic growth shows positive effect on the votes for pro-reform parties
and negative effect on the votes for left wing and nationalist parties (however, both effects are
only (marginally) significant in the regressions that include also the indices of liberalization
and democracy). Similarly, the higher the level of real output compared to 1989, the greater
the support for pro-reform parties and the lower the support for left-wing and nationalist
parties.
The effect of inflation is somewhat surprising. Apparently, inflation increases support for
the pro-reform parties and reduces support for the left wing and nationalist parties.
A plausible explanation is that the support for pro-reform parties rises when inflation is high,
as the voters’ turn to the pro-reform parties with a record of reigning in inflation.
The magnitude of these effects is economically (and politically) significant. Pro-reform
parties lose on average one percentage point in support for each half a percentage point
increase in the unemployment rate or a reduction in the annual growth rate by three
                                                
13 Choosing the year prior to the election delivered worse quality of statistical fit.
14 The logit transformation corresponds to converting the dependent variable into the following form:
log [V/(1-V)], where V is the vote share for a particular party (cf. Greene, 1997, p. 895).21
percentage points. Left wing and nationalist parties gain correspondingly. Hence, an increase
in the unemployment rate by 4 percentage points—as was for example the case in the Czech
Republic between elections in 1996 and 1998—transforms into a vote loss of 8 percentage
points for the reformers. On the other hand, every 100 percentage-point increase in the
inflation rate expands the votes for the pro-reform parties by four percentage points.
Controlling for the effects of liberalization and democracy on electoral outcomes
improves the quality of statistical fit (except for the regression according to incumbency). The
results paint a somewhat peculiar pattern though: the support for pro-reform parties is
inversely related to liberalization but positively related to democracy. Both effects are
economically significant. Importantly, the vote gain from democratization is greater that the
vote loss from economic liberalization. An increase in the value of the democracy index by
0.1 (recall that both indices range between 0 and 1) transforms into a gain of four percentage
points for the pro-reform parties. The same increase in the liberalization index reduces the
vote for the pro-reform parties by 3.5 percentage points. This empirical finding goes counter
the argument put forward by some analysts, who argue that the governments implementing
wide-ranging reforms need to be shielded from political backlash caused by adverse short-
term effects of the reforms. On the contrary, democracy-minded reformers are apparently
rewarded by voters (which, however, does not make them immune to political backlash,
which can still occur in response to the adverse effects of the reforms). The effect of
liberalization and democracy on the support for left wing and nationalist parties is positive,
but essentially insignificant (perhaps because of the correlation between the two indices, as
the effect turns out significant when only one index is included).
Greater liberalization brings about lower support for the pro-reform parties, even after
controlling for the economic effects of the reforms—unemployment, growth, output fall and
inflation. Hence, adverse effects of economic reforms apparently go beyond what is
accounted for by basic economic statistics. A plausible interpretation is that the progress in
liberalization is positively correlated with the fraction of the electorate affected by transition-
related redistribution of rents and relative socio-economic deprivation. This is likely to be the
case at least in the short term, whereas the favorable effects of the reform generally accrue
later.
Regression with parties classified according to incumbency result in worse statistical fit
than regressions according to parties’ political orientation. This is analogous to the findings
reported by Fidrmuc (2000b). Only unemployment rate and output level are significant and22
have the expected signs. Growth is insignificant and even has the wrong sing. Finally, greater
democracy makes the government more likely to be toppled in an election (although the effect
is barely marginally significant).
The stronger results when parties are classified according to their political orientation
rather than incumbency suggest that the patterns of political support are rather stable over
time and independent of the parties’ incumbency status. Hence, voters’ support is associated
with the political orientation of individual parties (and thus the policies that the parties are
expected to deliver) rather than the past performance of the party or coalition currently in
office. The former pattern of voters’ support—clientelistic/forward-looking voting (Nannestad
and Paldam, 1994)—implies that voters tend to associate themselves with a party that best
represents their interests. It contrasts with the latter pattern—retrospective voting—which is
the pattern typically observed in developed countries, where voters punish the government for
bad economic performance by voting for the opposition.
7  Conclusions
The present paper documents and analyzes several important inter-relations between
economics and politics during the post-communist transitions in Central and Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union. The results can be summarized as follows: (1) Liberalization has
a strong positive effect on growth during transition. This holds also when controlling for the
possible endogeneity of liberalization in growth. (2) Democracy encourages liberalization,
countries which introduced greater democracy subsequently progress further in economic
liberalization too. (3) Because of its reinforcing effect on liberalization, democracy has a
positive overall impact on growth. Nevertheless, the marginal effect of democracy (after
controlling for progress in economic liberalization) was negative during the early part of
transition. (4) The progress in democratization in turn depends on past economic performance
in a surprising manner—the relationship between past growth and subsequent democracy
appears negative. Further research may be necessary to illuminate this result. (5) Economic
performance is an important determinant of electoral outcomes and, in particular, of support
for reforms. Support for parties associated with reforms falls with unemployment and
increases with growth, output level relative to 1989 and, somewhat surprisingly, inflation.
Hence, there are merits to simultaneous democratization and liberalization—democracy
facilitates liberalization, which, in turn, improves growth performance. This is an important23
lesson for those transition economies, that remain autocratic (e.g. China, Belarus, Serbia—at
least until recently), those that may now be reversing the initial democratization (e.g. Russia
under president Putin) in the hope of improving economic performance, as well as other non-
democratic developing countries. Yet, democratization alone is not the key to growth, it is
through its positive impact on economic liberalization that it improves growth performance. A
centrally planned democracy would be even less conducive to growth than an autocratic
market economy.
Finally, economic performance is an important determinant of political processes, and in
particular electoral outcome. Hence, while radical reforms generally give rise to better
economic performance in the long term, the need to sustain sufficient political support for
their continuation requires careful balancing of costs and benefits of reforms and in particular
their effects on different socio-economic groups.
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Table 1  Countries in Transition: Indicators of Economic Performance, Liberalization, Democracy, and Initial Conditions
Avg.
Growth
Avg.
Growth
Avg.
Growth
Output
Fall
Output
Recovery
GNP p.c.
[USD]
Liberal.
Index
Liberal.
Index
Democr.
Index
Democr.
Index
Dist. Fr.
Brussels
Sec.Sch.
Enrollm
Pop.
Growth
Pop.
Growth
1990-98 1990-93 1994-98 1990-98 1990-98 1989 1990-93 1994-98 1990-93 1994-98 [km] [Denizer] 1990-93 1994-98
Albania -0.77 -8.83 5.68 60.38 26.02 1400 0.40 0.63 0.479 0.517 2427 79 -0.40 0.98
Armenia -7.06 -22.98 5.68 31.00 9.84 5530 0.25 0.57 0.479 0.483 4167 85 1.73 0.33
Azerbaijan -8.04 -14.53 -2.86 36.96 6.65 4620 0.16 0.45 0.313 0.250 4321 83 1.41 1.08
Belarus -2.43 -5.35 -0.10 62.69 15.06 7010 0.17 0.41 0.479 0.250 1881 92 0.31 -0.23
Bulgaria -4.37 -7.40 -1.94 63.69 2.23 5000 0.58 0.63 0.729 0.783 2175 71 -1.17 -0.51
Croatia -2.43 -12.35 5.50 58.58 17.94 6171 0.69 0.75 0.500 0.500 1399 80 0.06 -1.20
Czech Rep. -0.36 -3.65 2.28 85.24 10.54 8600 0.68 0.83 0.854 0.917 913 89 -0.07 -0.07
Estonia -2.68 -11.23 4.16 60.76 14.98 8900 0.49 0.80 0.646 0.867 2508 92 -0.99 -0.91
Georgia -9.76 -25.80 3.08 25.38 7.42 5590 0.23 0.55 0.354 0.483 4193 82 -0.04 0.01
Hungary -0.41 -4.78 3.08 81.89 13.36 6810 0.73 0.84 0.854 0.917 1412 81 -0.25 -0.35
Kazakhstan -5.14 -6.38 -4.16 61.26 0.00 5130 0.22 0.58 0.375 0.250 6000
e 90 0.35 -1.10
Kyrgyzstan -4.84 -9.25 -1.32 50.39 9.99 3180 0.25 0.70 0.500 0.483 6000
 e 88 0.87 0.94
Latvia -4.67 -14.33 3.06 50.97 8.27 8590 0.40 0.72 0.625 0.850 2197 92 -0.93 -1.09
Lithuania -4.08 -12.05 2.30 53.47 12.12 6430 0.45 0.74 0.688 0.900 1785 78 0.26 -0.15
Macedonia -5.32 -13.05 0.86 55.11 4.09 3394 0.68 0.67 0.563 0.600 2225 80 -0.83 0.78
Moldova -10.98 -12.33 -9.90 32.36 0.00 4670 0.26 0.62 0.375 0.567 2233 81 -0.01 -0.23
Poland 1.98 -3.05 6.00 82.21 34.94 5150 0.76 0.81 0.833 0.900 1338 83 0.32 0.11
Romania -2.77 -6.45 0.18 74.99 1.10 3470 0.40 0.65 0.396 0.717 2234 80 -0.43 -0.22
Russia -6.14 -7.80 -4.82 55.89 0.00 7720 0.31 0.67 0.563 0.567 2607 92 0.13 -0.22
Slovakia 0.22 -6.83 5.86 74.97 24.67 7600 0.66 0.79 0.771 0.733 1223 96 0.13 0.25
Slovenia 0.57 -4.08 4.28 82.04 21.95 9200 0.73 0.79 0.729 0.917 1352 80 -0.41 0.15
Tajikistan -8.61 -12.18 -5.76 39.19 2.78 3010 0.15 0.41 0.313 0.067 6000
 e 73 2.13 1.62
Turkmenistan -8.32 -4.50 -11.38 41.99 1.76 4230 0.09 0.31 0.188 0.000 6000
 e 70 4.64 1.82
Ukraine -10.29 -10.63 -10.02 36.76 0.00 5680 0.13 0.52 0.563 0.583 2215 80 0.20 -0.74
Uzbekistan -1.12 -3.08 0.44 83.36 6.23 2740 0.16 0.54 0.208 0.050 6000
 e 94 2.18 1.83
Average -4.31 -9.71 0.01 57.66 10.08 5432 0.401 0.640 0.535 0.566 2992 83.64 0.37 0.12
Sources: EBRD Transition Report (various issues), de Melo et al. (1996, 1997), Freedom House, World Bank World Development Report 1996, Shell Route Planner.
Notes: Output Fall is the lowest level of GDP attained between 1990 and 1998, with 1989=100. Output Recovery is the cumulative increase in GDP (in percent) since
reaching the lowest level. GNP per capita in 1989 is in US$ at purchasing power parity as reported by de Melo et al. (1996). Liberalization Index is unweighted mean of the
indices constructed by de Melo et al., as extended by Havrylyshyn et al. (1998). The index ranges between zero (no liberalization) and one (complete liberalization).
Democracy Index is average of political rights and civil liberties (reported by the Freedom House), respectively, ranging between zero (no democracy) and one (complete
democracy). Distance from Brussels is road distances in kilometers. Distances indicated with 
e are estimates rather than actual distances. School enrollment is according to
Denizer (1997) and relates to early 1990s. Population growth is from Campos (1999).28
Table 2A Economic Liberalization, Initial Conditions and Growth
Period: 1990-98 t-stat 1990-98 t-stat 1990-98 t-stat 1990-98 t-stat 1990-93 t-stat 1990-93 t-stat 1994-98 t-stat 1994-98 t-stat
Growth Rate of: GDPpc GDPpc GDPpc GDP GDPpc GDPpc GDPpc GDPpc
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant -7.438 -0.68 -2.335 -0.21 11.409 1.11 18.264 1.64 1.853 0.14 16.048 1.46 -15.582 -0.88 -4.777 -0.22
Dummy 1994-98 4.160 2.92 -8.479 -1.64 3.937 3.937 3.926 2.85
Liberalization Index 12.941 4.08 8.752 2.57 -41.252 -4.75 -51.148 -5.44 12.467 2.83 -40.539 -2.98 22.675 3.13 -5.222 -0.14
Liberalization Squared 56.998 5.84 66.337 6.40 58.712 4.09 23.339 0.72
Liberalization 1994-98 20.657 3.12
Dist. fr. Brussels [ths km] -0.356 -0.83 -0.145 -0.30 -0.427 -1.16 -0.194 -0.51 0.528 0.91 0.037 0.08 -0.796 -1.47 -0.837 -1.63
Sec. School Enrollment 0.1389 1.57 0.097 1.39 0.175 2.89 0.164 2.79 0.005 0.06 0.088 1.36 0.225 2.73 0.251 2.53
War Dummy -8.404 -4.02 -9.011 -4.49 -9.346 -5.80 -9.529 -5.73 -9.831 -5.31 -10.037 -6.71
War Dummy (lagged) 2.865 1.55 4.056 2.44 4.725 2.65 4.981 2.93 4.567 2.92 4.834 2.82
1989 GNP p.c. [log, ths $] -1.908 -1.47 -1.957 -1.61 -3.275 -3.00 -3.779 -3.11 -1.930 -1.25 -3.183 -2.93 -1.939 -1.00 -2.527 -1.17
Adj.R
2 0.705 0.757 0.802 0.793 0.606 0.735 0.546 0.530
Joint Sign. Liberalization 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003
Number of observations 50 50 50 50 25 25 25 25
Min/Max effect at: 0.36 0.39 0.35 0.11
Notes: Estimated by OLS with heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics, for the 25 countries included in Table 1. Dependent variable is the growth rate of GDP per capita
(GDPpc), or the growth rate of GDP. Columns (1) through (4) are estimated with observations for 1990-93 and 1994-98 pooled together. The liberalization index is the
average annual liberalization index over the respective period, as constructed by de Melo et al. (1996) and extended by Havrylyshyn et al. (1998). Liberalization 1994-98 is
an interaction term between the liberalization index and the dummy for 1994-98. The conflict dummy equals one for Croatia, Macedonia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia
and Tajikistan. The initial per capita GNP is in purchasing power parity terms, in US dollars. The distance from Brussels for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan is estimated as 6,000 km. Secondary school enrolment is according to Denizer (1997), in percent. Joint Significance Liberalization is the joint
significance level of the liberalization index and its squared value. Minimum/Maximum effects refer to the level where the effect of liberalization reaches its minimum or
maximum in the non-linear specification.29
Table 2B Economic Liberalization, Initial Conditions and Growth:
Liberalization Estimated with Instrumental Variables
Period: 1990-98 t-stat 1990-93 t-stat 1994-98 t-stat 1990-98 t-stat 1990-93 t-stat 1994-98 t-stat
Growth Rate of: GDPpc GDPpc GDPpc GDPpc GDPpc GDPpc
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Constant 6.427 0.61 19.632 1.62 -21.395 -1.23 5.339 0.47 17.208 1.30 -25.186 -1.46
Dummy 1994-98 1.768 1.18 2.026 1.48
Liberalization Index -29.365 -2.87 -52.121 -2.63 28.103 3.79 -28.193 -2.94 -36.682 -2.07 34.092 4.95
Liberalization Squared 48.758 4.45 74.249 3.66 48.288 5.06 57.587 3.22
Dist. fr. Brussels [ths km] -0.021 -0.05 -0.112 -0.20 -0.263 -0.45 -0.058 -0.15 -0.066 -0.11 -0.074 -0.15
Sec. School Enrollment 0.173 3.08 0.083 1.49 0.256 3.62 0.230 3.49 0.071 1.22 0.390 5.63
War Dummy -9.518 -5.58 -10.218 -6.60 -9.180 -5.26 -9.963 -6.11
War Dummy (lagged) 4.978 2.65 5.079 3.03 4.207 2.12 4.769 2.53
1989 GNP p.c. [log, ths $] -3.082 -2.75 -3.222 -2.81 -2.196 -1.13 -3.562 -2.80 -3.192 -2.42 -3.588 -1.73
Adj.R
2 0.800 0.723 0.576 0.782 0.692 0.549
Joint Sign. Liberalization 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 50 25 25 50 25 25
Min/Max effect at: 0.30 0.35 0.29 0.32
Notes: Estimated by OLS with heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics, for the 25 countries included in Table 1. See also Notes to Table 2A. Joint Significance Liberalization
is the joint significance level of the liberalization index and its squared value. Minimum/Maximum effects refer to the level where the effect of liberalization reaches its
minimum or maximum in the non-linear specification.
The liberalization index has been instrumented by its lagged value (columns 9-11) or its initial value as of 1989 (columns 12-14), initial GNP, years under
communism, conflict dummy, and quadratic time trend (using annual observations for 1990-98). The first-stage regressions (with heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics in
parentheses) are:
Columns 9-11:
LIt = 0.343 (5.72) + 0.607 (7.85) LIt-1 + 0.010 (2.53) GNP - 0.004 (4.43) YrsCom - 0.014 (0.93) War + 0.053 (3.63) t – 0.006 (4.32) t
2   [adjusted R
2 = 0.875]
Columns 12-14:
LIt = 0.514 (9.29) + 0.151 (3.15) LI1989 + 0.024 (6.54) GNP – 0.008 (11.08) YrsCom - 0.012 (0.74) War + 0.168 (19.05) t – 0.015 (13.82) t
2   [adjusted R
2 = 0.813]
where LI stands for the annual liberalization index, LI1989 is the value of this index attained in 1989, GNP is the initial GNP per capita, YrsCom is the number of years the
country spent under communism, War is the conflict dummy and t is transition-time trend set to zero for years preceding the onset of transition. Transition time is defined
following Fischer and Sahay (2000, Figure 1).30
Table 3A Democracy and Growth: Marginal Effect
Period: 1990-98 t-stat 1990-98 t-stat 1990-98 t-stat 1990-93 t-stat 1994-98 t-stat 1994-98 t-stat
Growth Rate of: GDPpc GDPpc GDP GDPpc GDPpc GDPpc
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 11.284 1.10 8.308 0.75 15.876 1.32 12.312 1.25 5.044 0.22 -14.138 -0.82
Dummy 1994-98 4.024 3.05 -1.828 -0.55 -0.965 -0.27
Liberalization Index -40.846 -4.73 -26.635 -2.36 -39.631 -3.32 -35.507 -2.78 -35.069 -0.71 16.307 1.61
Liberalization Squared 56.046 5.83 44.886 4.04 57.663 4.97 57.623 4.40 39.248 1.07
Democracy 0.854 0.22 1.423 0.38 -0.029 -0.01 -8.016 -1.56 8.269 1.13 4.861 0.90
Democracy 1990-93 -8.709 -2.05 -7.203 -1.58
Dist. fr. Brussels [ths km] -0.385 -0.82 -0.357 -0.75 -0.196 -0.41 -0.120 -0.25 -0.475 -0.72 -0.567 -0.87
Sec. School Enrollment 0.176 2.95 0.162 2.92 0.152 2.75 0.089 1.22 0.339 2.54 0.267 2.91
War Dummy -9.274 -5.40 -10.109 -5.77 -10.263 -5.93 -10.732 -6.61
War Dummy (lagged) 4.791 2.54 4.910 2.70 5.042 2.82 5.602 2.77 4.912 2.90
1989 GNP p.c. [log, ths $] -3.340 -2.96 -2.724 -2.16 -3.231 -2.30 -2.388 -2.20 -3.803 -1.54 -2.453 -1.23
Adj.R
2 0.798 0.802 0.789 0.739 0.525 0.530
Joint Sign. Liberalization 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.167
Number of observations 50 50 50 25 25 25
Min/Max effect at: 0.36 0.30 0.34 0.31 0.447
Notes: Estimated by OLS with heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics, for the 25 countries included in Table 1. See also Notes to Table 2. Democracy Index is the based on
the average of political rights and civil liberties according to the Freedom House and normalized so that it ranges between zero and unity (see Notes to Table 1). The indices
used in the regressions are the averages for the respective periods. Joint Significance Liberalization is the joint significance level of the liberalization index and its squared
value. Minimum/Maximum effect refers to the level where the effect of liberalization reaches its minimum or maximum in the non-linear specification.31
Table 3B Democracy and Growth: Overall Effect
Period: 1990-98 t-stat 1990-98 t-stat 1990-98 t-stat 1990-93 t-stat 1994-98 t-stat 1994-98 t-stat
Growth Rate of: GDPpc GDPpc GDP GDPpc GDPpc GDPpc
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Constant -3.897 -0.38 -0.869 -0.08 2.925 0.22 -6.848 -0.64 -8.165 -0.46 -7.725 -0.45
Dummy 1994-98 4.820 3.31 -9.049 -2.44 -10.004 -2.36
Residual Liberalization 9.961 2.47 20.796 4.22 20.651 3.94 17.213 3.85 14.870 1.15 16.307 1.61
Res. Liberalization Sqrd. 16.967 1.08 27.522 1.95 29.028 1.92 35.741 1.76 56.207 0.32
Democracy 13.815 3.23 19.099 3.48 18.811 3.36 9.130 1.60 12.825 2.46 11.947 2.87
Democracy 1990-93 -20.015 -4.71 -21.412 -4.23
Dist. fr. Brussels [ths km] 0.000 0.00 -0.112 -0.20 0.121 0.21 0.703 1.09 -0.498 -0.69 -0.567 -0.87
Sec. School Enrollment 0.142 1.65 0.111 1.89 0.092 1.37 0.012 0.18 0.276 2.86 0.267 2.91
War Dummy -8.022 -3.60 -10.631 -5.22 -10.853 -4.95 -11.331 -5.35
War Dummy (lagged) 3.714 2.05 4.496 2.64 4.492 2.73 5.083 2.88 4.912 2.90
1989 GNP p.c. [log, ths $] -2.679 -2.02 -1.580 -1.17 -1.774 -1.10 -1.056 -0.88 -2.610 -1.26 -2.453 -1.23
Adj.R
2 0.712 0.771 0.730 0.617 0.505 0.530
Joint Sign. Liberalization 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.131
Number of observations 50 50 50 25 25
Min/Max effect at: -0.29 -0.38 -0.36 -0.24 -0.132
Notes: Estimated by OLS with heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics, for the 25 countries included in Table 1. See also Notes to Table 2. Democracy Index is the based on
the average of political rights and civil liberties according to the Freedom House and normalized so that it ranges between zero and unity (see Notes to Table 1). The indices
used in the regressions are the averages for the respective periods. Joint Significance Liberalization is the joint significance level of the liberalization index and its squared
value. Minimum/Maximum effect refers to the level where the effect of liberalization reaches its minimum or maximum in the non-linear specification.32
Table 4 Determinants of Democracy 1994-98
Dependent Variable 1994-98 t-stats 1994-98 t-stats 1994-98 t-stats 1994-98 t-stats 1994-98 t-stats
Democracy Index (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -0.107 -0.26 0.307 0.60 -0.324 -0.87 0.230 0.51 0.014 0.03
Liberalization 1990-93 0.623 3.45 0.919 6.10 0.150 0.79
Democracy 1990-93 0.512 2.39 1.034 4.50 0.815 2.68
Growth 1990-93 -0.027 -6.87 -0.019 -5.03 -0.030 -6.31 -0.015 -2.43
Residual Growth 1990-93 -0.021 -2.38
Distance from Brussels [ths km] -0.024 -1.35 -0.047 -2.11 -0.031 -1.68 -0.118 -6.81 -0.043 -1.81
War Dummy -0.342 -5.42 -0.200 -5.22 -0.419 -5.56 -0.235 -2.97 -0.046 -0.91
1989 GNP p.c. [log, ths $] 0.004 0.10 -0.034 -0.57 0.049 1.19 0.071 1.29 0.023 0.51
Adj.R
2 0.906 0.856 0.885 0.672 0.814
Notes: Estimated by OLS with heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics, for the 25 countries included in Table 1. See also Notes to Table 2. Democracy Index is based on the
average of political rights and civil liberties according to the Freedom House and normalized so that it ranges between zero and unity (see Notes to Table 1). The indices
used in the regressions are the averages for the respective periods. The liberalization index is from de Melo et al. (1996), as extended by Havrylyshyn et al. (1998). The
democracy is based on indices of political freedoms and civil liberties reported by the Freedom House. Residual Growth is the component of the overall growth rate that
cannot be attributed to the influences of economic liberalization, democracy, wars or initial conditions. It is determined as the residual from the following regression
(heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics in parenthesis):
Grpc90-93 = 13.650 (1.43) - 31.659 (2.42) *LI90-93 + 53.164 (3.90) *LI90-93
2 - 7.953 (1.51) *DI90-93 - 0.036 (0.07) *Dist - 11.019 (6.61) *War - 1.773 (1.66) *GNP [Adj.R
2
0.741]
where Grpc stands for the growth rate of per-capita GDP, LI is the liberalization index, DI is the democracy index, Dist measures the distance from Brussels, War is the
dummy for military conflicts, and GNP is the log of 1989 GNP.33
Table 5 Economic Performance and Election Results
Pro-reform
Parties
t-stats Left wing +
Nationalists
t-stats Incumbents t-stats
Constant 8.736 0.84 39.338 3.42 1.720 0.09
Unemployment Rate -1.966 -5.86 1.943 4.18 -1.103 -3.21
Growth Rate 0.381 1.40 -0.265 -0.90 -0.349 -1.01
Output [1989=100] 0.492 4.43 -0.086 -0.79 0.488 2.46
Avg. Inflation 0.040 8.08 -0.030 -5.01 0.004 0.46
Adj. R
2 0.785 0.646 0.365
Pro-reform
Parties
t-stats Left wing +
Nationalists
t-stats Incumbents t-stats
Constant 12.444 2.03 23.098 2.52 12.051 0.67
Unemployment Rate -1.979 -5.64 1.939 4.25 -1.095 -3.03
Growth Rate 0.364 1.59 -0.445 -1.92 -0.212 -0.57
Output [1989=100] 0.379 4.43 -0.200 -2.72 0.612 2.48
Avg. Inflation 0.037 10.46 -0.030 -9.02 0.005 0.73
Liberalization Index -34.788 -2.97 12.766 0.84 3.787 0.19
Democracy Index 40.113 3.27 19.880 1.31 -29.328 -1.48
Adj. R
2 0.815 0.687 0.316
Notes: Estimated by OLS with heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics. Number of observations is 17. The parties
are classified along two dimensions: pro-reform vs. left-wing and nationalists, and incumbent vs. other (not
reported). Average vote shares are 35.6% for the pro-reform parties, 48.6% for the left wing and nationalists, and
32.8% for the incumbent. The dependent variable is the share of votes for parties in the respective category in
elections in the Czech Republic (1992, 1996, 1998), Slovakia (1992, 1994, 1998), Hungary (1994, 1998), Poland
(1993, 1997), Romania (1992, 1996), Bulgaria (1991, 1994, 1997), and Slovenia (1992, 1996). All explanatory
variables pertain to the election year. See the Notes following Table 1 for definitions of individual explanatory
variables.
Source of election data: Berglund et al. (1998).THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE
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